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Abstract New versions of the set-valued average value at risk for multivariate risks are introduced by
generalizing the well-known certainty equivalent representation to the set-valued case. The first ’regulator’
version is independent from any market model whereas the second version, called the market extension,
takes trading opportunities into account. Essential properties of both versions are proven and an algo-
rithmic approach is provided which admits to compute the values of both version over finite probability
spaces. Several examples illustrate various features of the theoretical constructions.
Keywords average value at risk · set-valued risk measures · coherent risk measures · transaction costs ·
Benson’s algorithm
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1 Introduction
The average value at risk for univariate random variables may be seen as a prototype for sublinear
(coherent) risk measures. It has several representations and many remarkable properties like law invariance
and the Fatou property, and it is linked with second order stochastic dominance. For this and more details,
compare [7, Chap. 4], [1,20].
Moreover, the computation of its values is a tractable problem: Rockafellar and Uryasev [21] discovered
that the computation and optimization of the scalar AV@R over a finite probability space can be done
via linear programming methods.
In this note, we introduce new set-valued versions of the average value at risk for multivariate random
variables, show essential properties and provide a computational method to obtain their values. The first
Birgit Rudloff’s research was supported by NSF award DMS-1007938.
Andreas H. Hamel
Yeshiva University
Department of Mathematical Sciences
E-mail: hamel@yu.edu
Birgit Rudloff
Princeton University
ORFE, BCF
tel. + 1(609)258-4558
fax + 1(609)258-3791
E-mail: brudloff@princeton.edu
Mihaela Yankova
Barclays Capital, New York
E-mail: mihaela.yankova@gmail.com
2 A. Hamel, B. Rudloff, M. Yankova
version is called ’regulator average value at risk’ since it does not take into account trading opportunities
while the second version is called ’the market extension’ since it involves a specific market model.
We will consider market models with proportional transaction costs/bid-ask spreads. It has been
shown in [13] that for such models, set-valued risk measures are an appropriate instrument to evaluate
multivariate risks. Later, a more complete theory for such risk measures has been formulated in [8], [9].
We also show that the regulator version of the set-valued average value at risk can be understood
as a set-valued representation of a non-complete risk preference. In turn, this preference is represented
as the intersection of a collection of complete risk preferences which correspond to scalarizations of the
set-valued risk measure. Such a representation is useful for computational issues since it involves nothing
else than a family of well-known scalar average value at risks. It also is helpful from a conceptual point
of view since it provides a link between set-valued risk measures and existing concepts for scalar risk
measures for multivariate positions as defined, for example, in [6].
One may ask the question why (seemingly complicated) set-valued functions are used as risk measures.
The idea is to collect all deterministic initial portfolios which compensate for the risk of a multivariate
position into one set and call this set the value of the risk measure at this position. Of course, this set,
in general, includes many elements which ”super-compensate” the risk, and a decision maker would only
be interested in some minimal elements of this set. The point is that there are, again in general, many
non-comparable minimal elements if transaction costs are present.
For mathematical reasons, it is much easier to work with the whole set of super-compensating portfolios
rather than with the set of its minimal elements (a set, nontheless!): Important properties like convexity
are easily obtained for the whole set and almost never for the set of minimal elements. Surprisingly,
the numerical method presented in this note provides the knowledge about the whole set in terms of
(some of its) minimal elements with respect to a given pre-order, so the decision maker gets precisely the
information (s)he may need.
The examples at the end illustrate various features of the theoretical construction, among them the
geometry of the image sets. Moreover, it is shown that one can also obtain information about trading
strategies (example 3.4) and that a scalar approach via liquidation has clear disadvantages compared
to the set-valued one (see remark 3.5). Moreover, we show how one can deal, at least in principle, with
interest rates (example 3.7) and exchange rate risks (example 3.2).
This note utilizes the general framework given in [9], and the results are partially based on [23].
2 Set-valued average value at risk
2.1 The regulator case
Let d ≥ 1 be a positive integer and (Ω,FT , P ) a probability space. A multivariate random variable is
an FT -measurable function X : Ω → IR
d for d ≥ 2. If d = 1, the random variable is called univariate.
Denote by L0d = L
0
d (Ω,FT , P ) the linear space of the equivalence classes (with respect to the probability
measure P ) of IRd-valued random variables. An element X ∈ L0d has components X1, . . . , Xd in L
0 = L01.
The symbol 1I denotes the random variable in L0 which has P -almost surely the value 1. Finally, L1d =
L1d (Ω,FT , P ) denotes the linear space of all X ∈ L
0
d with
∫
Ω
|X (ω)| dP < +∞, where |·| stands for an
arbitrary, but fixed norm on IRd.
We shall write (
L0d
)
+
=
{
X ∈ L0d | P
({
ω ∈ Ω | X (ω) ∈ IRd+
})
= 1
}
for the set of IRd-valued random variables with P -almost surely non-negative components, and define(
L1d
)
+
= L1d ∩
(
L0d
)
+
. The set
(
L1d
)
+
is a closed convex cone in the Banach space L1d. If d = 1 we write
L0+ and L
1
+ for
(
L0d
)
+
and
(
L1d
)
+
, respectively.
The following definition gives a primal representation for the set-valued average value at risk which
extends the certainty equivalent representation of the scalar AV@R as given in [21]. It involves a linear
subspace M ⊆ IRd, called the space of eligible assets. The idea is that a risk evaluation of a multivariate
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position could be done in terms of portfolio vectors instead of units of a single nume´raire. This is motivated
by the fact that in the presence of transaction cost there exist portfolios which cannot be exchanged into
one another. A natural choice is M = IRm × {0}d−m, 1 ≤ m ≤ d, i.e, the first m out of d assets are
eligible as deposits (as in [13], [2]), but more general constructions are possible (see [9] and example 3.2
below). Let us denote M+ =M ∩ IR
d
+ and assume M+ is non-trivial, i.e. M+ 6= {0}.
The reader may keep in mind that the multivariate position X models a random future portfolio
consisting of d assets where each component gives the number of units of the corresponding asset hold
at the future time. Thus, Xi (ω) is the number of units of asset i in the portfolio if ω occurs. Thus, we
follow the ”physical unit” approach initiated by Kabanov [14]. The same interpretation applies to a risk
compensating portfolio u ∈ M deposited at initial time: ui is the number of units of asset i potentially
given as a deposit at initial time.
We will use the symbol diag (α) with α ∈ IRd in order to denote the d×d matrix with the components
of the vector α as entries of its main diagonal and zero entries elsewhere.
Definition 2.1 Let α ∈ (0, 1]d and X ∈ L0d. The regulator average value at risk at X is defined as
AV@Rregα (X) =
{
diag (α)−1 IE [Z]− z | Z ∈
(
L1d
)
+
, X + Z − z1I ∈
(
L0d
)
+
, z ∈ IRd
}
∩M. (2.1)
Remark 2.2 If m = d = 1, the two conditions Z ∈ L1+ and X + Z − z1I ∈ L
0
+ are equivalent to
Z ≥ (−X + z1I)+ with X+ = max {0, X} (P–a.s.). We obtain AV@Rregα (X) = AV@R
sca
α (X)+IR+ with
AV@Rscaα (X) = inf
z∈IR
{
1
α
IE
[
(−X + z1I)+
]
− z
}
, (2.2)
which is the optimized certainty equivalent representation of the AV @R found by Rockafellar and Uryasev
[21]. Compare also Fo¨llmer and Schied [7], formula (4.42). Note that AV@Rscaα (X) = +∞ if (−X)
+ 6∈ L1.
Remark 2.3 The following observations will lead to an interpretation of formula (2.1). Let M = IRm ×
{0}d−m (hence M+ = IR
m
+ × {0}
d−m
) with 1 ≤ m ≤ d, i.e., the first m assets are eligible. In this case,
the objective and the constraints can be considered component-wise, and we obtain for i = 1, . . . ,m
{
1
αi
IE [Zi]− zi | Zi ∈ L
1
+, Xi + Zi − zi1I ∈ L
0
+, zi ∈ IR
}
=
{
1
αi
IE [Zi]− zi | Zi ≥ max {0, zi1I−Xi} = (zi1I−Xi)
+ , zi ∈ IR
}
= inf
{
1
αi
IE
[
(zi1I−Xi)
+
]
− zi | zi ∈ IR
}
+ IR+ = AV@R
sca
αi
(Xi) + IR+.
For i = m+1, . . . , d, there must exist Zi ∈ L1+, zi ∈ IR
d such that 0 = 1
αi
IE [Zi]−zi and Xi+Zi−zi1I ∈ L0+.
This means AV@Rscaαi (Xi) ≤ 0. Altogether, the set-valued regulator AV@R produces the component-wise
scalar AV@R for the first m components plus the cone IRm+ ×{0}
d−m
under the constraint that the scalar
AV@R for the last d−m components is at most zero. If the latter is not the case, AV@Rregα (X) = ∅. So,
the set-valued regulator average value at risk is either ”point plus cone” or the empty set. This simple
geometry will change if M has a different structure as shown in example 3.2.
Proposition 2.4 The function X 7→ AV@Rregα (X) enjoys the following properties:
(a) it is positively homogeneous, i.e.
∀X ∈ L0d, ∀s > 0: AV@R
reg
α (sX) = sAV@R
reg
α (X) ,
(b) it is subadditive, i.e.
∀X1, X2 ∈ L0d : AV@R
reg
α
(
X1 +X2
)
⊇ AV@Rregα
(
X1
)
+AV@Rregα
(
X2
)
,
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(c) it is M -translative, i.e.
∀X ∈ L0d, ∀u ∈M : AV@R
reg
α (X + u1I) = AV@R
reg
α (X)− u,
(d) it is monotone with respect to
(
L0d
)
+
, i.e.
X1, X2 ∈ L0d, X
2 −X1 ∈
(
L0d
)
+
⇒ AV@Rregα
(
X2
)
⊇ AV@Rregα
(
X1
)
,
(e) for each X ∈ L0d, the set AV@R
reg
α (X) ⊆M is convex and satisfies
AV@Rregα (X) +M+ = AV@R
reg
α (X) .
In particular, AV@Rregα (0) is a convex cone which satisfies
M+ ⊆ AV@R
reg
α (0) , AV @R
reg
α (0) ∩ −M+ = {0} .
Proof. (a) Easy to check. (b) Taking X1, X2 ∈ L0d we obtain
AV @Rregα (X1) +AV@R
reg
α (X2)
=
{
diag (α)−1 IE
[
Z1
]
− z1 + diag (α)−1 IE
[
Z2
]
− z2 | Z1, Z2 ∈
(
L1d
)
+
, z1, z2 ∈ IRd,
X1 + Z
1 − z11I ∈
(
L0d
)
+
, X2 + Z
2 − z21I ∈
(
L0d
)
+
}
∩M
⊆
{
diag (α)
−1
IE
[
Z1 + Z2
]
−
(
z1 + z2
)
| Z1 + Z2 ∈
(
L1d
)
+
,
X1 +X2 + Z
1 + Z2 −
(
z1 + z2
)
1I ∈
(
L0d
)
+
, z1 + z2 ∈ IRd
}
∩M
=
{
diag (α)
−1
IE [Z]− z | Z ∈
(
L1d
)
+
, X1 +X2 + Z − z1I ∈
(
L0d
)
+
, z ∈ IRd
}
∩M
= AV@Rregα (X1 +X2) .
Again, (c) is straightforward. (d) AV@Rregα is
(
L0d
)
+
-monotone since for U ∈
(
L0d
)
+
we have U+
(
L0d
)
+
⊆(
L0d
)
+
and therefore
AV@Rregα (X − U) =
{
diag (α)
−1
IE [Z]− z | Z ∈
(
L1d
)
+
, X + Z − z1I ∈ U +
(
L0d
)
+
, z ∈ IRd
}
∩M
⊆ AV@Rregα (X) .
(e) The convexity of AV@Rregα (X) is obtained from (a) and (b) since for s ∈ (0, 1)
AV@Rregα (X) = AV@R
reg
α (sX + (1− s)X) ⊇ sAV@R
reg
α (X) + (1− s)AV@R
reg
α (X) .
(a) yields that AV@Rregα (0) is a convex cone. If k ∈M+ then
(
L0d
)
+
+ k1I ⊆
(
L0d
)
+
and hence
AV@Rregα (X) + k =
{
diag (α)−1 IE [Z]− z˜ + k | Z ∈
(
L1d
)
+
, X + Z − z˜1I ∈
(
L0d
)
+
, z˜ ∈ IRd
}
∩M
=
{
diag (α)
−1
IE [Z]− z | Z ∈
(
L1d
)
+
, X + Z − z1I ∈ k1I +
(
L0d
)
+
, z ∈ IRd
}
∩M ⊆ AV@Rregα (X) .
Finally, while obviously 0 ∈ AV@Rregα (0) 6= ∅, take k ∈ M+\ {0} (non-empty by assumption) and
s > 0. Assume −sk ∈ AV@Rregα (0). Then, there is Z ∈
(
L1d
)
+
, z ∈ IRd such that Z − z1I ∈
(
L0d
)
+
and
−sk = diag (α)−1 IE [Z]− z. These conditions imply Z ∈
(
L1d
)
+
and
Z − sk − diag (α)−1 IE [Z] ∈
(
L1d
)
+
.
At least one component of k is positive, say ki > 0. Multiplying the above inclusion with Y ∈ (L
∞
d )+
defined by Yi = e
i1I and Yj ≡ 0 for j 6= i and taking the expected value we obtain
IE [Zi]
(
1−
1
αi
)
− ski ≥ 0.
Since αi ≤ 1 and IE [Zi] ≥ 0, this contradicts ski > 0. Therefore, −sk 6∈ AV@Rregα (0) for s > 0 and
AV@Rregα (0) 6=M . 
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Remark 2.5 The acceptance set of a set-valued risk measure is the set of all X ∈ L0d such that 0 ∈ M
is included in the value of the risk measure at X (see [9]), and there is the usual one-to-one relationship
between acceptance sets and risk measures. We obtain from definition 2.1 that the acceptance set of
AV@Rregα is
Areg =
{
X ∈ L0d | 0 ∈ AV @R
reg
α (X)
}
=
{
X ∈ L0d | ∃Z ∈
(
L1d
)
+
: X + Z − diag (α)−1 IE [Z] 1I ∈
(
L0d
)
+
}
.
The set Areg obviously is a convex cone, and it satisfies Areg +
(
L0d
)
+
= Areg as well as the following
two non-triviality conditions: M+1I ⊆ Areg and (−M+1I) ∩ Areg = {0}. Indeed, while the first condition
is trivial (choose Z = 0), the second follows from (c) and (e) of proposition 2.4. The average value at risk
can be recovered from Areg by
AV@Rregα (X) = {u ∈M | X + u1I ∈ A
reg} ,
that is, it includes all initial eligible portfolios which make the position X acceptable.
2.2 Scalarization and interpretation
In the following, we assume that the value AV@Rregα (X) is a non-empty closed set. Since it is also
convex, it is the intersection of all closed half-space including it. Such a half space has a normal w ∈
(IRd+ ∩M)
+\ {0} = (IRd+ +M
⊥)\ {0}. Thus,
u ∈ AV@Rregα (X) ⇔ ∀w ∈ (IR
d
+ +M
⊥)\ {0} : wTu ≥ inf
{
wTx | x ∈ AV@Rregα (X)
}
.
Now, consider the extended real-valued function
X 7→ ϕAV@Rregα ,w (X) = inf
{
wTu | u ∈ AV @Rregα (X)
}
.
Note that ϕAV@Rregα ,w+v = ϕAV@Rregα ,w whenever v ∈ M
⊥ since AV@Rregα (X) ⊆ M for all X ∈ L
0
d.
Thus, one can restrict the functions ϕAV@Rregα ,w to those with w ∈ IR
d
+ and obtains
u ∈ AV@Rregα (X) ⇔ ∀w ∈ IR
d
+, ∀v ∈M
⊥, w + v 6= 0: (w + v)T u ≥ ϕAV@Rregα ,w (X) .
Defining the set B (1) = {w ∈ IRd+ |
∑d
i=1 wi = 1} and using the positive homogeneity with respect to w
of the functions ϕAV@Rregα ,w one can further show that
u ∈ AV@Rregα (X) ⇔ ∀w ∈ B (1) , ∀v ∈ M
⊥, w + v 6= 0: (w + v)T u ≥ ϕAV@Rregα ,w (X) .
It turns out that the functions ϕAV@Rregα ,w are composed of scalar AV@R-type functions for the
components of X . More precisely, we have the following result.
Proposition 2.6 Let AV@Rregα (X) 6= ∅, w ∈ IR
d
+\ {0} and I> (w) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , d} | wi > 0}. Then
ϕAV@Rregα ,w (X) =
∑
i∈I>(w)
wiAV@R
sca
αi
(Xi) . (2.3)
Proof. The crucial observation is as follows. If u ∈ AV@Rregα (X) then there are Z ∈
(
L1d
)
+
, z ∈ IRd
such that u = diag (α)−1 IE [Z]− z and X + Z − z1I ∈
(
L0d
)
+
. Hence
wTu =
∑
i∈I>(w)
(
1
αi
IE [wiZi]− wizi
)
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since there is zero contribution to this sum whenever wi = 0. Since the components are ”separated” we
have
ϕAV@Rregα ,w (X) =
∑
i∈I>(w)
inf
{(
1
αi
IE [wiZi]− wizi
)
| Zi ∈
(
L1
)
+
, Xi + Zi − zi1I ≥ 0
}
=
∑
i∈I>(w)
inf
{(
1
αi
IE [wiZi]− wizi
)
| wiZi ∈
(
L1
)
+
, wiXi + wiZi − wizi1I ≥ 0
}
=
∑
i∈I>(w)
inf
{(
1
αi
IE [Ui]− ri
)
| Ui ∈
(
L1
)
+
, wiXi + Ui − ri1I ≥ 0
}
which, in view of remark 2.2 and positive homogeneity of the scalar average value at risk, already is the
result. 
Proposition 2.6 together with the discussion preceding it provides the following representation of the
set-valued average value at risk. If AV@Rregα (X) is closed then
AV @Rregα (X) =
⋂
w∈B(1), v∈M⊥, w+v 6=0
{
u ∈ IRd | (w + v)T u ≥ ϕAV@Rregα ,w (X)
}
. (2.4)
Thus, formula (2.3) means that the functions ϕAV@Rregα ,w entering (2.4) are mixtures (= convex
combinations) of the scalar average value at risks applied to the components of the multi-variate position
X . Moreover, u ∈ AV@Rregα (X) if and only if the mixture w
Tu = (w + v)T u (since u ∈M) compensates
for the risk of the mixture wTX for all w ∈ B (1). Put differently, the ”mixed” number wTu is not less
than the corresponding mixture of the scalar average value at risks applied to the components of X . This
interpretation also explains why the vector α may have different components. The decision maker may
have a different attitude towards the risk of each component of the portfolio vector X - which contains
the ”physical” units of each asset.
Finally, the vector w ∈ B (1) may be understood as a weighting of the d assets: A decision maker may
have more and less favorable assets when it comes to risk evaluation. The formulas (2.3) and (2.4) also
mean that the regulator does not care about weightings of the decision makers: The regulator needs to
be on the safe side no matter what kind of weighting a particular decision maker may have.
The reader may observe that this discussion shows that there is a relationship between the scalar
average value at risk applied to the components of X and the set-valued one. This relationship does not
mean, in general, that the set-valued AV@R can always be represented as ”vector of the component-wise
taken scalar AV@Rs plus a convex cone”. Example 3.2 provides a counterexample.
Rather, the relationship expressed in (2.4) may be interpreted as follows. Each scalar function ϕAV@Rregα ,w
induces a complete risk preference whereas the risk preference represented by the set-valued function
AV@Rregα is a non-complete one: There might be positions X
1, X2 whose risks cannot be compared.
We conclude this discussion with the following result which relates the scalarizations ϕAV@Rregα ,w to
existing concepts.
Proposition 2.7 Let w ∈ B (1) and e = (1, . . . , 1)T ∈ IRd. Then
∀s ∈ IR, ∀X ∈ L0d : ϕAV@Rregα ,w (X + se1I) = ϕAV@Rregα ,w (X)− s.
Proof. Immediate using (2.3) and the translation property of the scalar average value at risk. 
We note that proposition 2.7 shows that the functions ϕAV@Rregα ,w share all properties of scalar risk
measures for IRd-valued risks as defined in [6, Definition 1.2], and this property does not coincide in
general with the translation property M2) in [4, Definition 3.1].
Set-valued average value at risk and its computation 7
2.3 The market extension
The average value at risk from definition 2.1 does not take into account a market model. Therefore, we
define its market extension (see [9] for a general definition and further motivation). We consider a discrete
market at time points {0, 1, ..., T } and a filtered probability space (Ω,FT , (Ft)
T
t=0 , P ) satisfying the usual
conditions. A discrete conical market model is a sequence of Ft-measurable functions Kt : Ω → 2IR
d
,
t = 0, 1, . . . , T with IRd+ ⊆ Kt 6= IR
d such that Kt (ω) is a closed convex cone for each ω ∈ Ω and
all t ∈ {0, . . . , T }. These cones are called solvency cones and appear, for example, when proportional
transaction costs are present. Compare [14,22,15]. Measurability of the solvency cone mapping means,
as usual, that for each open set B ⊆ IRd the set {ω ∈ Ω | Kt (ω) ∩B 6= ∅} is an element of Ft.
We denote KM0 = K0∩M which is non-trivial sinceM+ is non-trivial and IR
d
+ ⊆ K0. Let L
0
d (Ω,Ft, P )
be the linear space of equivalence classes of IRd-valued, Ft-measurable random variables. Further, denote
L0d (Kt) =
{
X ∈ L0d (Ω,Ft, P ) | P ({ω ∈ Ω | X (ω) ∈ Kt (ω)}) = 1
}
for t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T }. Finally, define the set
CT = −
T∑
t=0
L0d (Kt) ⊆ L
0
d
which includes all payoffs which can be generated by trading with initial portfolio 0 ∈ IRd. Elements of
CT are also called freely available payoffs, and CT is a convex cone in L
0
d.
Definition 2.8 Let α ∈ (0, 1]d and X ∈ L0d. The market extension of AV@R
reg
α at X is defined as
AV @Rmarα (X) =
{
diag (α)−1 IE [Z]− z | Z ∈
(
L1d
)
+
, X + Z − z1I ∈ −CT , z ∈ IR
d
}
∩M. (2.5)
Remark 2.9 Formula (2.5) can be rewritten as
AV@Rmarα (X) =
⋃
{AV@Rregα (X + Y ) | Y ∈ CT } . (2.6)
Indeed, this follows from the equation −CT+
(
L0d
)
+
= −CT and the definition of AV@Rregα . Formula (2.6)
has a nice financial interpretation: The market AV@R produces all initial portfolios which compensate
for the risk of X plus a freely available payoff. Thus, an investor who is faced with the risk described by
X may add a freely available payoff to X and then compensate for the overall risk. This offers greater
flexibility once a market model is fixed.
Remark 2.10 Formula (2.6) has another, mathematical interpretation. Define the set
C (M,M+) = {D ⊆M | D = co (D +M+)} .
Then (C (M,M+) ,⊇) is an order complete lattice in the sense that every subset D ⊆ C (M,M+) has an
infimum and a supremum in C (M,M+) with respect to ⊇, namely
inf D = co
⋃
D∈D
D and supD =
⋂
D∈D
D,
respectively. Then,
AV@Rmarα (X) = inf {AV @R
reg
α (X + Y ) | Y ∈ CT } (2.7)
where the infimum is taken in (C (M,M+) ,⊇). Indeed, everything is obvious but the missing convex
hull. It can be dropped since the set
⋃
{AV@Rregα (X + Y ) | Y ∈ CT } is convex due to the convexity of
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X 7→ AV@Rregα (X). Indeed, if u
1, u2 ∈
⋃
{AV@Rregα (X + Y ) | Y ∈ CT }, then there are Y
1, Y 2 ∈ CT
such that ui ∈ AV@Rregα
(
X + Y i
)
, i = 1, 2, and
su1 + (1− s)u2 ∈ sAV@Rregα
(
X + Y 1
)
+ (1− s)AV@Rregα
(
X + Y 2
)
⊆ AV@Rregα
(
X + sY 1 + (1− s)Y 2
)
⊆ AV@Rmarα (X) (2.8)
since sY 1 + (1− s)Y 2 ∈ CT by convexity of CT .
Thus, AV@Rmarα (X) is the optimal value of a minimization problem with a set-valued objective.
Remark 2.11 Another motivation to consider market extensions is given by its economic interpretation
as valuation bounds: The two functions X 7→ AV@Rmarα (−X) and X 7→ −AV@R
mar
α (X) are the set-
valued analogs to good deal bounds with respect to the risk measure AV@R, see e.g. [12] for the scalar
case. This allows to consider tighter valuation bounds than the ones obtained by superhedging in markets
with transaction costs. One can see this by noting that AV@Rregα (X) ⊇ WC (X) for all X ∈ L
0
d, where
WC (X) = {u ∈ M | X + u1I ∈
(
L0d
)
+
} is the worst case risk measure, see section 5.3 in [9]. Then,
equation (2.6) implies
AV@Rmarα (−X) ⊇
⋃
{WC (−X + Y ) | Y ∈ CT } = {u ∈M | −X + u1I ∈ CT } .
where the right hand side coincides with the set of portfolios inM that allow to superhedge X , see [14,22,
15,18]. Thus, the upper valuation bound AV@Rmarα (−X) ∈ C (M,M+) contains more and thus cheaper
portfolios compared to the set of superhedging portfolios and the lower valuation bound−AV@Rmarα (X) ∈
C (M,−M+) contains more and thus more expensive portfolios compared to the set of subhedging port-
folios.
The market extension shares several, but not all properties with the regulator AV@R.
Proposition 2.12 The market extension AV @Rmarα satisfies (a), (b), (c) of proposition 2.4 and more-
over
(d’) it is monotone with respect to −CT , i.e.
X1, X2 ∈ L0d, X
2 −X1 ∈ −CT ⇒ AV@R
mar
α
(
X2
)
⊇ AV@Rmarα
(
X1
)
,
(e’) for each X ∈ L0d, the set AV@R
mar
α (X) ⊆M is convex and satisfies
AV @Rmarα (X) +K
M
0 = AV @R
mar
α (X) .
In particular, AV@Rmarα (0) is a convex cone with K
M
0 ⊆ AV@R
mar
α (0).
Proof. (a), (b), (c) and (e’) follow with similar arguments as in proposition 2.4. (d’) IfX2−X1 ∈ −CT
then there is Y 1 ∈ CT such that X1 = X2 + Y 1. Since CT is a convex cone we have Y 1 + CT ⊆ CT and
hence by (2.6)
AV @Rmarα
(
X1
)
=
⋃{
AV@Rregα
(
X2 + Y 1 + Y
)
| Y 1 + Y ∈ Y 1 + CT
}
⊆
⋃{
AV@Rregα
(
X2 + Y 1 + Y
)
| Y 1 + Y ∈ CT
}
=
⋃{
AV@Rregα
(
X2 + Y 2
)
| Y 2 ∈ CT
}
= AV@Rmarα
(
X2
)
.
This completes the proof. 
Property (e’) has the following interpretation. If X2 −X1 ∈ −CT , then X
1 is the sum of X2 and a
freely available payoff. Unless there is some kind of arbitrage opportunity, this means that X1 is somehow
”riskier” than X2, hence the set of initial eligible portfolios which compensate for the risk of X1 should
not be ”greater” than the corresponding set for X2.
A particular feature of the market extension is that ”finiteness” (see (e) of proposition 2.4) cannot be
guaranteed in general.
Remark 2.13 The acceptance set of AV@Rmarα is given by
Amar =
{
X ∈ L0d | ∃Z ∈
(
L1d
)
+
: X + Z − diag (α)−1 IE [Z] 1I ∈ −CT
}
= Areg − CT .
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3 Set-valued AV@R over finite probability spaces
In the rest of the paper, we impose the following assumptions and notational conventions.
(H1) |Ω| = N . FT = 2Ω, where the probability measure P is given by N strictly positive numbers
p = (p1, p2, . . . , pN ) with
∑N
n=1 pn = 1 and P ({ωn}) = pn, n = 1, . . . , N .
(H2) The vectors b1, . . . , bm ∈ IRd form a basis of the space M of eligible portfolios, the vectors
bm+1, . . . , bd ∈ IRd form a basis of M⊥. Of course, 1 ≤ m ≤ d, and b1, . . . , bd form a basis of IRd.
We exclude neither the case m = 1 nor the case m = d.
(H3) The cone K0 is spanned by h
1, . . . , hI ∈ IRd, thus it is a finitely generated (hence closed) convex
cone.
(H4) The cone KM0 = K0 ∩M is spanned by g
1, . . . , gL ∈ IRd, thus it also is a finitely generated, closed
convex cone. Note that this collection can be entirely different from h1, . . . , hI .
(H5) For each ω ∈ Ω, the cone KT (ω) is spanned by k1 (ω) , . . . , kJ(ω) (ω), thus it is a finitely generated
(hence closed) convex cone.
Note that assumptions (H3) and (H5) are always satisfied in markets with proportional transaction
costs where the solvency cones are generated by the bid and ask exchange rates between any two of the
d assets as for example considered in [14,22,15].
3.1 The discrete version of AV aRregα
In the following, we shall reformulate AV@Rregα given in (2.1) of definition 2.1 in a linear programming
language. We use the representation of the random variables X,Z : Ω → IRd by xin = Xi (ωn) and
zin = Zi (ωn) i = 1, . . . , d, n = 1, . . . , N and set
xˆ = (x11, . . . , xd1, x12, . . . , xdN)
T ∈ IRdN
zˆ = (z11, . . . , zd1, z12, . . . , zdN)
T ∈ IRdN .
First, the condition Z ∈
(
L1d
)
+
is equivalent to zˆ ∈ IRdN+ . Next, using
Iˆd =


Id
...
Id

 ∈ IRdN×d,
where Id is the d× d identity matrix and tˆ ∈ IR
dN
+ , we can write the condition Z +X − z1I ∈
(
L0d
)
+
as
zˆ + xˆ− Iˆdz = tˆ.
The objective function (Z, z) 7→ diag(α)−1IE [Z]−z can be given a matrix form as follows. If we define
P(n) = pnId ∈ IR
d×d, n = 1, . . . , N,
then Pˆ =
(
P(1) P(2) . . . P(N)
)
is a d× dN -matrix and
diag(α)−1IE [Z]− z = diag(α)−1Pˆ zˆ − z.
Finally, the constraint diag(α)−1IE [Z]− z ∈M can be written as follows. Denote by
B(d−m) =


bm+11 . . . b
m+1
d
...
. . .
...
bd1 . . . b
d
d

 ∈ IR(d−m)×d
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the matrix containing the generating vectors ofM⊥ as rows. Then, the condition diag(α)−1IE [Z]−z ∈M
is equivalent to B(d−m)(diag(α)
−1Pˆ zˆ − z) = 0.
Altogether, we end up with
AV@Rregα (X) =
{
diag(α)−1Pˆ zˆ − z | B(d−m)(diag(α)
−1Pˆ zˆ − z) = 0,
zˆ + xˆ− Iˆdz = tˆ, zˆ ∈ IR
dN
+ , tˆ ∈ IR
dN
+ , z ∈ IR
d
}
. (3.1)
This shows that AV@Rregα (X) is the image of a polyhedral set under a linear function mapping
IR2dN+d into M . In particular, by (H1) - (H5) AV@Rregα has a closed graph and closed values since all
these sets are polyhedral.
How can we compute the sets AV @Rregα (X), i.e. the values of the average value at risk? To do this,
one must first answer the question what it means ”to know” these sets. Here, we advance the view that
we know AV@Rregα (X) if we know its minimal points with respect to the order in M generated by
M+ = IR
d
+ ∩M , i.e. points u¯ ∈ AV@R
reg
α (X) satisfying
(u¯−M+) ∩ AV@R
reg
α (X) = {u¯} ,
and its directions of recession, that is k ∈M satisfying
∀s > 0: AV@Rregα (X) + sk ⊆ AV @R
reg
α (X) ,
which together form the recession cone. Moreover, in most cases it is sufficient to know those minimal
points of AV@Rregα (X) which are also extremal, i.e. vertices. The others can be recovered by taking
convex combinations. The set of extremal minimal points is finite since AV@Rregα (X) is polyhedral. This
point of view admits a financial as well as a mathematical interpretation. Financially, the minimal points
of AV@Rregα (X) represent the eligible portfolios which an investor might want to deposit since all others
are more expensive. Mathematically, the set AV@Rregα (X) can be reconstructed by taking the convex hull
of the union of the sets u¯+M+ and adding the recession cone where u¯ runs through the extremal minimal
points of AV@Rregα (X), thus taking the infimum in the space C (M,M+) (compare remark 2.10). This
corresponds to a solution concept for set-valued optimization problems like the one in (2.7) described in
[17, Chap. 2].
Thus, one needs an algorithm that computes the (extremal) minimal points and the recession cone
of a polyhedral convex set which is the image of another polyhedral set under a linear map as in (3.1).
Such an algorithm is the one given by H. Benson in [3] which has been extended and modified in [17] and
further in the forthcoming [10].
We emphasize two features of the algorithm1: First, computing the minimal points of the set given
in (3.1) means to solve a linear vector optimization problem, see, for example, [17, Part II]. Secondly,
Benson’s algorithm is perfectly suited for the problems at hand: It basically works in the image space,
here M with dimension m, which is in most cases very small compared to the dimension of the preimage
space, here 2dN + d.
A few examples shall illustrate the theory and point to some interesting features which appear in the
transaction cost setting.
Example 3.1 The number of assets is d = 2 and M = IR2, so all initial portfolios are eligible. In a
binary model with N = 2 and p = (0.4, 0.6), the payoff is given by
X(ω1) =
(
12
−20
)
, X(ω2) =
(
4
−6
)
.
We use α = (0.01, 0.02)T and obtain AV@Rregα (X) = (−4, 20)
T + IR2+. Thus, the minimal risk compen-
sating portfolio for a risk manager/regulator covers the worst case for the first and second asset which is
4 units and −20 units, respectively. The reason is that αi < pn for all i, n = 1, 2 in this simple example
which will reappear below.
1 For actual computations, we used a version of the algorithm, BENSOLVE, which is available online at
http://ito.mathematik.uni-halle.de/∼ loehne
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Example 3.2 Here d = 3, N = 3, p = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) and the payoff is given by
X(ω1) =

43
1

 , X(ω2) =

 6−5
−3

 , X(ω3) =

−23
−4

 .
We use α1 = α2 = α3 = 0.05. If M = IR
3 (all initial portfolios are eligible) then AV@Rregα (X) =
(2, 5, 4)T + IR3+, and again the three worst cases are covered.
If M is spanned by the two vectors (5, 0, 1)
T
and (0, 10, 1)
T
, then AV@Rregα (X) has two vertices
(17.5, 5, 4)T and (2, 36, 4)T , and its recession cone is M+ which is the convex cone generated by (5, 0, 1)
T
and (0, 10, 1)
T
.
This example illustrates the feature indicated in remark 2.3: If M is not of the form IRm × {0}d−m,
then AV@Rregα (X) is in general not ”point plus cone M+”.
One may interpret such an M as follows: Deposits always involve the third asset which may serve as
an insurance against the risks which come with the first two. For example, the first two assets may be
currencies and the third an insurance against exchange risk or something like a (partial) gold exchange
standard. In this sense, deposits in the third asset serve as a safeguard against exchange risk or simply
inflation.
Example 3.3 Let d = m = 2, thus M = IR2, N = 5, p = (0.25, 0.4, 0.3, 0.02, 0.03)T and the following
payoff
X(ω1) =
(
6
3
)
, X(ω2) =
(
−8
−6
)
, X(ω3) =
(
−4
2
)
,
X(ω4) =
(
−90
−6
)
, X(ω5) =
(
−80
−60
)
.
be given. With α = (0.05, 0.05)T one obtains AV@Rregα (X) = (84.0, 38.4)
T + IR2+. In contrast to the
previous examples, the α-levels do have an impact on the risk measure.
More complex examples with d = 5 assets and M = IR2 × {0}3 and a random variable X that is
the payoff of an outperformance option can be found in examples 3.6 - 3.8 in the next section where
AV@Rregα as well as AV@R
mar
α are calculated.
3.2 The discrete version of AV@Rmarα
In this section, we will restrict ourselves to one-period models since market extensions including trading
at times t = 0, ..., T typically involve path dependent strategies in markets with transaction costs and
should rather be formulated in a recursive way where attention should be paid to time consistency issues.
Let us assume from now on that trading is possible at time t = 0 and t = T . We will use Benson’s
algorithm to calculate AV@Rmarα (X) based on the ideas described in the previous subsection.
To do this, we need an analog of formula (3.1) for AV@Rmarα (X). All conditions in (2.5) are the same
as in AV@Rregα except the condition Z +X − z1I ∈ −CT = K01I + L
0
d (KT ). Let
H =


h11 · · · h
I
1
...
. . .
...
h1d · · · h
I
d

 ∈ IRd×I
be the matrix of generating vectors of K0, see assumption (H3).
Under assumption (H5), we have that for each ω ∈ Ω the coneKT (ω) is spanned by k1 (ω) , . . . , kJ(ω) (ω).
Denote Jn = J (ωn), n = 1, . . . , N , and let
Jˆ =
N∑
n=1
Jn.
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Let
A(n) =


k11n · · · k
Jn
1n
...
...
k1dn · · · k
Jn
dn

 ∈ IRd×Jn , n = 1, ..., N
be the matrices containing the generating vectors of KT (ω) as columns and
Aˆ =


A(1) 0 . . . 0
0 A(2)
...
...
. . .
0 . . . A(N)

 ∈ IR
dN×Jˆ
a diagonal matrix where 0 stands for blocks of zeros of appropriate dimensions. Consider the vector
sˆ = (s11, . . . , s1J1 , s21, . . . , s2J2 , . . . , sNJN ) ∈ IR
Jˆ .
Then the condition Z +X − z1I ∈ L0d (KT ) +K01I can equivalently be written as
zˆ + xˆ− Iˆdz = Aˆsˆ+ IˆdHtˆ
for sˆ ∈ IRJˆ+ and tˆ ∈ IR
I
+.
Using this and the results of section 3.1 for the other conditions we obtain
AV@Rmarα (X) =
{
diag(α)−1Pˆ zˆ − z | B(d−m)(diag(α)
−1Pˆ zˆ − z) = 0, (3.2)
zˆ + xˆ− Iˆdz = Aˆsˆ+ IˆdHtˆ, zˆ ∈ IR
dN
+ , sˆ ∈ IR
Jˆ
+, tˆ ∈ IR
I
+, z ∈ IR
d
}
.
Therefore, as in the regulator case, AV@Rmarα (X) is the image of a polyhedral set under a linear function
mapping IR(N+1)d+I+Jˆ into M ⊆ IRd. Its computation amounts to determine its minimal points with
respect to the order generated by KM0 .
Again, a few examples shall illustrate the theory for which we used an adapted version of the same
algorithm. The input parameters are the generating vectors g1, . . . , gL of the cone KM0 and the data from
(3.2).
Example 3.4 Let all input parameters and the payoff X be as in example 3.1. Let the two assets be a
USD cash account and one risky stock. The bid-ask prices of the risky stock at t = 0 are given by S0,b =
0.72, S0,a = 1 and at t = T by ST,b (ω1) = 0.75, ST,a (ω1) = 1.11 and ST,b (ω2) = 0.7, ST,a (ω2) = 0.9.
Then AV@Rmarα (X) has two vertices given by (−12, 20)
T and (−39, 56)T and a recession cone given by
K0.
With this result and (3.2) in view one may ask the following question. What is the significance of
the preimages which produce the two vertices? Two such preimages are the two points in IRdN+Jˆ+I+d =
IR4+4+2+2 = IR12 given by
(
zˆ1, sˆ1, tˆ1, z1
)T
= (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11.4286, 0, 0, 12,−20)T(
zˆ2, sˆ2, tˆ2, z2
)T
= (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 36, 0, 50, 0, 0, 39,−56)T
which were also produced by Benson’s algorithm. These two points are solutions of the problem repre-
sented by (3.2) in the sense that they generate two extremal minimal points of the set AV@Rmarα (X),
i.e., solutions of a linear vector optimization problem in a traditional sense. Moreover, it turns out that
the components sˆi, tˆi, i = 1, 2, yield two trading strategies such that the corresponding payoffs Y 1, Y 2
satisfy
AV@Rmarα (X) = co
(
AV@Rregα
(
X + Y 1
)
∪ AV@Rregα
(
X + Y 2
))
+K0.
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A comparison with formula (2.7) shows that the set
{
Y 1, Y 2
}
may be considered as a solution of the
set-valued optimization problem established in remark 2.10. This corresponds precisely to the (mild)
solution concepts given in [17, Chap. 2].
The two trading strategies may be described as follows. The first strategy consists of no trade at t = 0
since k10 = Htˆ
1 = (0, 0)T ∈ K0, no trade at t = T if ω1 occurs since k1T (ω1) = A1(sˆ
1
11, . . . , sˆ
1
1J1
)T =
(0, 0)T ∈ KT (ω1) and to sell 11.4286 units of stock (at price ST,b (ω2) = 0.7 which yields 8 USD)
if ω2 occurs since k
1
T (ω2) = A2(sˆ
1
11, . . . , sˆ
1
1J2
)T = (−8, 11.4286)T ∈ KT (ω2). If we denote by Y 1 ∈
CT = −K01I − L
0
d (KT ) the outcome of this optimal strategy starting from zero capital at t = 0 then
AV@Rregα
(
X + Y 1
)
= (−12, 20)T + IR2+ which corresponds to the first vertex of AV@R
mar
α (X).
The second strategy consists of no trade at t = 0 since k20 = Htˆ
2 = (0, 0)T ∈ K0, to sell 36 units of
stock (at price ST,b (ω1) = 0.75 which yields 27 USD) if ω1 occurs since k
2
T (ω1) = A1(sˆ
2
11, . . . , sˆ
2
1J1
)T =
(−27, 36)T ∈ KT (ω1) and to sell 50 units of stock (at price ST,b (ω2) = 0.7 which yields 35 USD) if ω2
occurs since k2T (ω2) = A2(sˆ
2
11, . . . , sˆ
2
1J2
)T = (−35, 50)T ∈ KT (ω2). If we denote by Y 2 the outcome of this
optimal strategy starting from zero capital at t = 0 then AV@Rregα
(
X + Y 2
)
= (−39, 56)T + IR2+ which
corresponds to the second vertex of AV@Rmarα (X).
The two strategies lead to terminal payoffs X + Y 1 and X + Y 2, respectively, which can be con-
sidered as risk minimal with respect to the risk measure AV@Rregα among all possible terminal payoffs
in X + CT according to remark 2.10. Since the representation (3.2) gives a linear relationship between
points
(
zˆ, sˆ, tˆ, z
)
and corresponding values diag(α)−1Pˆ zˆ − z each convex combination of Y 1 and Y 2 also
yields a risk minimal strategy with a minimal point of AV@Rmarα (X) which is the corresponding convex
combination of the two vertices above.
This shows that trading strategies which produce minimal elements ofAV @Rmarα (X) are also provided
by Benson’s algorithm.
Remark 3.5 Let us compare the set-valued approach to risk measurement to the scalar approach in
which it is usually assumed that a multivariate random variableX is first liquidated into a fixed nume´raire
asset and then a scalar risk measure is applied to the liquidated value of X (see e.g. [5], example 2.5, or
the standard assumption of liquidation in the scalar approach to utility maximization in markets with
transaction costs, see [11]).
In example 3.4 the results would be as follows. The scalar AV@R is calculated from the liquidated
payoff, where we use the liquidation functions according to the bid-ask prices at time T
l1 (X) (ω) = X1 (ω) +X2 (ω)ST,b (ω) I{X2(ω)≥0} +X2 (ω)ST,a (ω) I{X2(ω)<0},
l2 (X) (ω) = X2 (ω) +
X1 (ω)
ST,a (ω)
I{X1(ω)≥0} +
X1 (ω)
ST,b (ω)
I{X1(ω)<0}.
In example 3.4 the liquidated payoff is l1 (X) = (−10.2,−1.4) if X is liquidated into the first asset, and
l2 (X) = (−9.19,−1.6) if X is liquidated into the second asset. One obtains AV@Rscaα1 (l1 (X)) = 10.2
USD and AV@Rscaα2 (l2 (X)) = 9.19 units of stock.
The set AV@Rmarα (X) from example 3.4 intersects the 1- and 2-axis at (8, 0) and (0, 8), respec-
tively. Clearly,
(
AV@Rscaα1 (l1 (X)) , AV@R
sca
α2
(0)
)
= (10.2, 0) and
(
AV@Rscaα1 (0) , AV@R
sca
α2
(l2 (X))
)
=
(0, 9.19) are points in the interior of AV@Rmarα (X). This perfectly corresponds to findings in [2] where
it is shown that a multi-eligible asset approach may decrease the costs of superhedging.
Example 3.6 We consider an example with d = 5 assets. The first asset S1 is a USD cash account (zero
interest rate), the second is another currency (e.g. EUR), denoted in USD, and the other assets are risky
stocks denoted in USD. As the space of eligible assets we choose the space spanned by the first and the
second asset (the currencies), i.e. M = IR2 × {0}3. Let the initial prices of the 5 assets in USD be given
by S0 = (1, 1.3, 50, 6, 25)
T , let the covariance matrix of the 4 risky assets be

0.010 0.004 0.002 0.018
0.004 0.040 0.012 0.006
0.002 0.012 0.0225 0.012
0.018 0.006 0.012 0.040

 .
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and µ = (0.03, 0.1, 0.06, 0.12)T the drift vector of the 4 risky assets. Let the length of the one-period
model under consideration be one year.
We will follow the method in [16] to set up a (one-period) tree for the risky assets that reflects the
drift and correlation structure using the decoupling method with the Cholesky decomposition, see [16]
and also section 5.2 in [18] for more details in a setting similar to ours in markets with transaction costs.
We adapt the method to obtain a tree under the real world probability measure. The one-period tree
will have 2d−1 = 16 branches, i.e. N = 16 in this example and the probabilities of each path are given
by 2−4. Now, let us assume that the proportional transaction costs for the risky assets are given by
λ = (λ2, ..., λd)T = (0.07, 0.05, 0.01, 0.01)T and that the bid and ask prices at t ∈ {0, T } are given by
(Sbt )
i = Sit(1− λ
i), (Sat )
i = Sit(1 + λ
i), i = 2, ..., d.
Furthermore, let us assume an exchange between any two risky assets can not be made directly, only via
cash in USD by selling one asset and buying the other. Since all risky assets are denoted in USD, the
solvency cone Kt for t ∈ {0, T } is generated by the columns of the following matrix (see e.g. [19])

(Sat )
2 −(Sbt )
2 (Sat )
3 −(Sbt )
3 (Sat )
4 −(Sbt )
4 (Sat )
5 −(Sbt )
5
−1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1

 . (3.3)
As the payoff X we consider an outperformance option with strike K = (1 + λ1)S
2
0 = 1.378 and physical
delivery. This option gives the right to buy the asset that performed best out of a basket of assets at a
given strike price. A vector c is defined as (Sa0 )
2 = ci(S
a
0 )
i for i ∈ {2, ..., 5}. Let the payoff X be −K in
the USD account, ci units of asset i for the smallest i satisfying ci(S
a
T )
i = maxj∈{2,...,5}(cj(S
a
T )
j) ≥ K
and zero in the other assets. If maxj∈{2,...,5}(cj(S
a
T )
j) < K the payoff is the zero vector. The maturity T
is chosen as one year.
Let us calculate AV@Rregα (X) and AV@R
mar
α (X) with α = (0.1, 0.08, 0.09, 0.1, 0.05)
T . Formula (3.1)
leads to a problem with 85 variables, 166 constraints and 2 objectives. Formula (3.2) for AV@Rmar (X)
leads to a problem with 221 variables, 302 constraints and 2 objectives. AV@Rregα (X) has one vertex at
(1.3910, 0)T , which is the smallest cash deposit in the first two assets necessary to compensate the risk
of X without involving trading. The recession cone of AV@Rregα (X) is IR
2
+. The set AV @R
mar (X) has
five vertices that are given by the columns of the following matrix
(
0.8858 0.4200 0.3404 0.2794 −0.0699
−0.7160 −0.3771 −0.3166 −0.2698 0
)
and the recession cone KM0 .
Example 3.7 Let us consider the same model as in example 3.6, now with an annual interest rates of
5% for the riskless asset denoted USD. Let (S0)
1 = (1+ r)−1 = 0.9524 and (ST )
1 = 1. All the other input
parameters are as before. The solvency cones change in the sense that in the matrix (3.3) all the values
±1 are replaced by ±(S0)1, see [19].
The set AV @Rregα (X) has one vertex at (1.391, 0)
T and recession cone IR2+, i.e. it is the same as
before. To calculate the smallest deposit in cash (USD and EUR), one just needs to multiply the number
of USD bonds with the initial bond price (S0)
1 = 0.9524.
The set AV@Rmarα (X) has, in contrast to the previous case, seven vertices given by the columns of
the following matrix
(
4.7411 4.1666 3.9181 0.8716 0.3954 0.2508 −0.1087
−3.3883 −2.9941 −2.8235 −0.7160 −0.3771 −0.2698 0
)
and the recession cone KM0 .
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Example 3.8 Let us consider the same model as in example 3.7, now with transaction costs λ0 = 0.03
for the riskless asset. That means (Sb0)
1 = (1−λ0)(1+r)−1, (Sa0 )
1 = (1+λ0)(1+r)
−1 and (SbT )
1 = (1−λ0),
(SaT )
1 = (1+λ0). All the other input parameters are as before. The solvency cones now have 20 generating
vectors instead of 8, for details see e.g. [19].
Again, AV@Rregα (X) = (1.391, 0)
T + IR2+. The set AV@R
mar
α (X) has eleven vertices (in USD bonds
and EUR) given by the columns of the following matrix(
−0.0640 6.9490 5.0535 4.2335 1.8394 1.3989 1.1107 1.0965 0.4243 0.2970 0.2024
0 −4.7770 −3.5156 −2.9696 −1.3630 −1.0652 −0.8621 −0.8520 −0.3700 −0.2746 −0.2033
)
and the recession cone KM0 . Formula (3.2) for AV@R
mar
α (X) leads to a problem with 425 variables, 506
constraints and 2 objectives.
Example 3.9 Let us calculate the market extension AV@Rmarα (X) for the payoff X and all parameters
given by example 3.2, where M is spanned by the two vectors (5, 0, 1)T and (0, 10, 1)T . Let the d = 3
assets be the first three assets of example 3.6. The one-period tree has 2d−1 = 4 branches, i.e. N = 4.
Then, the set AV @Rmarα (X) has five vertices given by the columns of the following matrix
−1153.3 −656.2 −544.0 13.5 118.62056.4 1172.2 973.4 5.0 −177.1
−25.0 −14.0 −11.5 3.2 6.0


and the recession cone KM0 .
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